Grand Valley Journal of History
Volume 5

Issue 1

Article 1

3-27-2018

Not Written In Letters of Blood: The Forgotten Legacy of the Army
of the Cumberland
Andrew R. Perkins
Cedarville University, aperkins@cedarville.edu

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh
Part of the Military History Commons, and the United States History Commons

Recommended Citation
Perkins, Andrew R. (2018) "Not Written In Letters of Blood: The Forgotten Legacy of the Army of the
Cumberland," Grand Valley Journal of History: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1 , Article 1.
Available at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol5/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@GVSU. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Grand Valley Journal of History by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@GVSU. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@gvsu.edu.

Not Written In Letters of Blood: The Forgotten Legacy of the Army of the
Cumberland
Cover Page Footnote
CEDARVILLE UNIVERSITY “NOT WRITTEN IN LETTERS OF BLOOD”: THE FORGOTTEN LEGACY OF THE
ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND A RESEARCH PAPER SUBMITTED TO THE GRAND VALLEY JOURNAL OF
HISTORY BY ANDREW R.E. PERKINS 19 JANUARY 2017

This article is available in Grand Valley Journal of History: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol5/iss1/1

Perkins: Not Written in Letters of Blood

There is a chapter missing in the annals of Civil War history. The story of an
entire army, and the thousands of men that comprised it, is being widely
overlooked by the majority of Civil War historians. That army, the Union Army
of the Cumberland, has begun to fade into public obscurity due to four main
factors: poorly timed defeats and victories in battle, personal feuds and politicking
between Union officers, the mistakes of the army’s commanders, and the undue
emphasis of Civil War historians on Southern romanticism.
The Two Armies: Potomac and Cumberland
While the largest Union army of the war, the Army of the Potomac, has
numerous publications lining the shelves of libraries around the country, the
second largest army, the Army of the Cumberland, has garnered no such attention.
For proof, look no further than texts written about the Battle of Gettysburg (in
which the Army of the Potomac took part), which make up approximately half of
the 65,000 books about the Civil War.1 This is relatively unsurprising, as
Gettysburg does represent perhaps the Union’s finest victory of the war, on its
bloodiest battlefield. However, by comparison, the Battle of Stones River, one of
the more notable battles in which the Army of the Cumberland took part, has
received just four full volumes written about it,2 despite being a significant Union

Alexander Atkins, “Gettysburg by the Numbers” Atkinsbookshelf.com.
Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die, (Urbana, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991), ix.
Larry J. Daniel. wrote a book on the battle later, and his book is added to Cozzens’ figure.
1
2
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victory with the highest casualty percentage of the entire war.3 To uncover why
the Army of the Potomac has been studied so thoroughly while the Army of the
Cumberland has not, both armies need to be examined through their leadership,
battles fought, and the soldiers themselves.
The Army of the Potomac lacked respectable leadership for the first half
of the war. While its founder, George B. McClellan, was organizationally
brilliant, he failed miserably during his Peninsular Campaign and barely gained
success at Antietam. Following his failure to pursue Lee after the Maryland
Campaign, Lincoln began a practice he would be forced to implement far too
many times for this army; he removed McClellan from command. His successor,
Ambrose Burnside, fared no better, displaying his incompetence through a
horrible mauling at the Battle of Fredericksburg. In his footsteps came Joseph
Hooker, who was trounced almost as badly at the Battle of Chancellorsville.
Finally George Meade, the fourth and final commander of the Army of the
Potomac, won at Gettysburg and proved himself worthy of command even after
Ulysses S. Grant came east to supervise the army in 1864.4
The performance of the soldiers was generally better than their
commanders. Though some of the men did wilt away in lopsided battles like

3
4

James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 582.
William Swinton, Army of the Potomac, 227, 253-54, 303-07, 410-11.
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Second Bull Run and Chancellorsville, most of the time they performed
admirably, such as when they made assault after assault on Marye’s Heights at
Fredericksburg or the Sunken Road at Antietam. Units earned nicknames like
“The Fighting 69th”5 and the “Iron Brigade.”6 The grit and determination of these
kinds of men showed that their own commanders did not deserve them, nor did
those soldiers deserve the defeats their officers so graciously handed to them time
after time.
The Army of the Cumberland did not struggle quite as badly when it came
to commanders. While the army was still referred to as the Army of the Ohio, it
was commanded by Don Carlos Buell. While Buell was not a particularly brilliant
man, he did come to Grant’s aid and help save the Battle of Shiloh for the Union,7
and he managed to turn Confederate General Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee
out of Kentucky, despite his poor handling of the Battle of Perryville.8 After Buell
was replaced because of that tactical loss, the army found its second commander,
who would bring the soldiers together into a fully functioning and successful
military unit. That commander was William Starke Rosecrans. He led the Army
of the Cumberland to victory at Stones River and Tullahoma, before being
soundly defeated at the Battle of Chickamauga. After Chickamauga, Grant

5

Larry J. Daniel, Days of Glory, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004) xii.
McPherson, Battle Cry, 528.
7
Daniel, Days, 84.
8
McPherson, Battle Cry, 520-22.
6
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replaced Rosecrans with George Thomas, a tough, stoic Virginian who led the
army to even greater victories at Missionary Ridge, Atlanta, Franklin, and
Nashville. All totaled, the Army of the Cumberland earned more victories and less
defeats than the Army of the Potomac by a wide margin.9
This was due at least in part to the gallantry and valor of the
Cumberlanders themselves, whose fighting performance on an individual basis
was similar to their Eastern counterparts. Still, the two armies were more different
than alike. One of the differences between the two was that the Army of the
Cumberland had a distinctly Western flavor. While the Army of the Potomac was
made up of genteel Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, and East Coasters who had
worked in shops and on fishing boats, the Army of the Cumberland was
comprised of rough and tumble farmers and woodsmen from Ohio, Indiana,
Michigan, and Illinois.10 When Eastern Confederate troops under James
Longstreet joined their Western comrades in 1863, they were warned that:
Them fellers out thar you ar goin’ up again, ain’t none of the blue-bellied,
white-livered Yanks an’ sassidge-eatin’ forrin hirelin’s you have in

9

The Army of the Potomac won three clear victories: Antietam, Gettysburg and Petersburg
(though Grant’s Overland Campaign of 1864 was a strategic victory, the battles that made up that
campaign were tactically inconclusive). In contrast, they were defeated during the Peninsula
Campaign, at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and large groups of which participated in
losses at Bull Run, Second Bull Run, and the Shenandoah Valley Campaign. The Cumberlanders,
on the other hand, found victory at Shiloh, Stones River, Tullahoma, Chattanooga, Atlanta,
Franklin, Nashville, and the March to the Sea, while losing only the Battle of Chickamauga and
fighting to a draw at Perryville.
10
Daniel, Days, xii, 3.
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Virginny that’ll run at the snap of a cap—they are Western fellers, an’
they’ll mighty quick give you a bellyful o’ fightin’.11

While officers in the Army of the Potomac like McClellan believed in a
high degree of pomp and circumstance, Western commanders like Buell,
Rosecrans, and Thomas had no time for such triviality.12 As the men in the Army
of the Potomac favored small, fashionable French caps called kepis, many
Westerners wore large-brimmed slouch hats to keep the sun off of their necks and
out of their faces.13 Overall, it could be said that the Army of the Cumberland was
somewhat more casual than their Eastern counterparts. However, certainly the
biggest difference between the two was
that the Cumberlanders found more
success in battle and had better leadership
than their peers in the hard-luck Army of
the Potomac.
This leads to an intriguing

Cumberlanders atop
Lookout Mountain

“Potomacs” after the Battle of
Fredericksburg

dilemma: If the soldiers of both armies were largely equal in fighting skill and
performance in battle, and the Army of the Cumberland was largely more

11

Peter Cozzens, This Terrible Sound: the Battle of Chickamauga, (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1996) 203,Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb, (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1971), 340.
12
Rosecrans was known for munching on an unlit cigar during battle, while Thomas often fell
asleep during war council meetings.
13
This can be observed when comparing photographs of units from the Eastern Theater with those
from the Western Theater, as displayed by the inset on this page. (Photo courtesy: National
Archives).
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successful than the Army of the Potomac, why is it the latter that receives nearly
all the attention?
Poorly Timed Battles
The answer could lie in the timing of the victories and defeats of the two
armies, coupled with the close proximity of Washington, D.C. to the Army of the
Potomac. While the Army of the Cumberland’s (Army of the Ohio’s) first victory
at Shiloh on April 7th, 1862 was certainly praised throughout some of the
Northern press, it came on the heels of McClellan’s campaign on the Virginia
Peninsula where the newspapers and politicians in Washington focused their
attention, believing it to be the campaign to end the war.14 McClellan’s campaign
with the newly christened Army of the Potomac was certainly destined to turn
heads, since the effort consisted of a massive naval operation to move an entire
army by sea to make a ground assault against the capital of the Confederacy,
Richmond, Virginia beginning at Fort Monroe (near Norfolk). The splendor and
enthusiasm of McClellan’s eastern troops was unparalleled in the world,
compounded by the sheer size of the Army of the Potomac, which numbered
upwards of 100,000 men when it stepped off the docks at Alexandria, Virginia on
March 17th.15 McClellan himself had already gained popularity from his

14
15

McPherson, Battle Cry, 437, 454.
Swinton, Potomac, 100.
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victorious skirmishes in Western Virginia and was a small but imposing figure of
strength in the Napoleonic vein of army commanders. His reorganization of Irvin
McDowell’s former Northeastern Virginia Army into his own Army of the
Potomac had Washington abuzz with excitement, and the eyes of the nation were
on “Little Mac” up until the moment he was turned back from the gates of
Richmond by Robert E. Lee.16
In contrast, the Army of the Ohio, commanded by the lackluster Don
Carlos Buell, numbered a modest 37,000 men when it helped turn the tide against
the Confederate Army of Mississippi at Shiloh on April 7th (though only 18,000
were engaged in the battle).17 While the campaign’s movement did consist of an
impressive march from Nashville to Savannah, Tennessee, and a stellar naval
operation to bring Buell’s men to Grant’s aid in the nick of time, none of it
compared to McClellan’s unprecedented amphibious effort with the Army of the
Potomac. In addition, the location of the showdowns played a role in how the
public viewed them. Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee River, where the Battle
of Shiloh took place, was hardly known outside of southwestern Tennessee, while
Richmond, McClellan’s target, had been seen as the key to winning the war for
the Union from the very beginning.18 Thus, when news of Union victory at a

16

McPherson, Battle Cry, 349.
Daniel, Days, 75, 83.
18
McPherson, Battle Cry, 334.
17
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small place called Shiloh reached the Northern people, initial cheer and
enthusiasm quickly faded as their hopes that McClellan would strike the final
blow to the heart of the Confederacy were dashed later in July. Similarly, when
Rosecrans led the Cumberlanders to victory at Stones River, it was not enough to
brighten the mood that had been dampened by Burnside’s disastrous defeat at
Fredericksburg a few weeks earlier.
The Battle of Fredericksburg began December 11th, 1862 and ended on the
15th, just two weeks before Rosecrans would lead his men at Stones River.
Ambrose Burnside, the newest commander of the 120,000-man Army of the
Potomac, had thus far outmaneuvered Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern
Virginia, numbering just under 80,000, and he hoped to pin down Lee’s forces
outside Fredericksburg, Virginia. Though Burnside had been hesitant to accept
command of the army a month before, since McClellan had been a close personal
friend and he was unsure he could live up to the legacy of “Little Mac,” he had
outpaced Lee’s army and gained the upper hand by rapidly moving his large army
towards Richmond. However, his wagon train had moved too slowly, and the
army could not cross the Rappahannock River and enter the town of
Fredericksburg until weeks after he had planned, giving Lee precious time to
fortify the heights outside of town and prepare. Instead of wisely withdrawing and
attempting to find another path to Richmond, Burnside foolishly sent his men in

https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol5/iss1/1
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piecemeal to their deaths on Marye’s Heights on December 13th and paid a heavy
cost of 12,321 men on the casualty list. Lee, on the other hand, lost only 5,309.19
The Battle of Fredericksburg sent shockwaves through the Northern
public. The New York Times wrote, “The Nation will stand aghast at the terrible
price which has been paid for its life when the realities of the battle-field of
Fredericksburgh [sic] are spread before it.”20 As the Army of the Potomac slinked
back towards the river it was named after, the North quickly settled into a gloom
that cast a pall over the remaining days of 1862.
The final day of that perplexing year for the Union, December 31st, saw
the beginning of a vicious battle near the city of Murfreesboro, Tennessee. Out
West, where the newspapers and Washington influence did not permeate the
public conscious, the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland awoke prepared to
face their enemy across the field—until that enemy drove through their lines
before their morning coffee had cooled. The opposing commanders, Braxton
Bragg and William Rosecrans, had both planned on using diversions on their
opponents’ left flank while driving hard into their right. Bragg’s plan called for an
attack just an hour before Rosecrans’, however, so it was the Confederates that
made their advance at 6 o’clock that morning.21 The right wing of the Army of the

19

Swinton, Potomac, 253.
“The Battle of Fredericksburg,” (New York Times, 1862).
21
Cozzens, Place to Die, 83.
20
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Cumberland collapsed almost immediately, having been unprepared for heavy
fighting. From the onset, it appeared New Year’s Eve would seal 1862 as the year
of Confederate triumph.22 However, in the coming hours, a stalwart defense by
Brigadier General Phil Sheridan and his troops in the center of the line, along with
the rallying of the right wing by Rosecrans, helped turn the tide enough to stifle a
complete victory for Bragg.23 Two days later, the Confederates attempted another
attack, but it was met with a hail of gunfire from forty-five Union cannons and a
devastating counterattack from several brigades of James Negley’s division.24
Bragg decided to retreat, leaving Rosecrans to claim a surprising victory.
When relaying to Rosecrans his gratitude at the triumph of the Army of
the Cumberland, President Lincoln wrote, “You gave us a hard-earned victory,
which had there been a defeat instead, the nation could scarcely have lived
over.”25 He was correct. The Northern press rejoiced in the news of Rosecrans’
victory, painting him as the hero of the Union. For once, it seemed that the Army
of the Cumberland’s exploits had been properly received. However, soon this
“thin gleam of cheer”26 wore off and could no longer boost the spirits of the
Northern people from the heartbreak of Fredericksburg.

22

Cozzens, Place to Die, 101.
Cozzens, Place to Die, 130.
24
Cozzens, Place to Die, 191-92.
25
Daniel, Days, 224.
26
McPherson, Battle Cry, 582.
23
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In the summer of 1863, the Cumberlanders would be outshone once more.
After constant prodding from the War Department in the six months following
Stones River, Rosecrans finally left his fortifications in Murfreesboro in late June,
brilliantly driving Bragg’s army completely out of Eastern Tennessee and into
Georgia, capturing eighty miles of land with very few casualties.27 In addition, by
the end of the Tullahoma Campaign (as it is now called), the Army of the
Cumberland stood unopposed at the gates of Chattanooga, Tennessee, a key
railroad hub for the Confederate Army. Unfortunately, this monumental campaign
concluded on July 3, 1863, the exact same day the Battle of Gettysburg ended
with the climactic and disastrous Pickett’s Charge, and just one day before the
Confederate Army of Mississippi and the heavily fortified city of Vicksburg,
Mississippi fell to Grant further west. Thus, the campaign was overlooked by the
Northern papers in favor of those two events. However, historian Steven
Woodworth has advanced the possibility that Rosecrans’ victory “hurt [the
Confederacy] worse in some ways than the nearly simultaneous Battle of
Gettysburg.”28 He adds, “[the campaign] cost the Confederacy a large swath of
valuable territory, and with it went perhaps as many as several thousand soldiers
who decided to give up the war and desert once their homes came within Union
lines.” Other historians, such as Earl Hess, have praised Rosecrans’ “well-planned

27

McPherson, Battle Cry, 669.
Steven E. Woodworth, Decision in the Heartland: The Civil War in the West, (Westport, Conn:
Praeger, 2008), 72.
28
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and finely executed”29 strategy, which did significant damage to the morale of the
remaining soldiers in the Confederate Army of Tennessee.
Afterwards, when Secretary of War Edwin Stanton telegrammed
Rosecrans proclaiming the great victories in Pennsylvania and Mississippi, and of
an opportunity for him to strike the third and final blow to end the war, an
appalled Rosecrans retorted, “I beg in behalf of this army that the War
Department may not overlook so great an event because it is not written in letters
of blood.”30 Even then, when the events themselves were unfolding, Rosecrans
could not help but feel that the poor timing of the army’s accomplishments were
depriving them of their share of the glory.
Perhaps Rosecrans was right. While it is not sound logic to decisively
conclude that the Cumberlanders have been neglected strictly due to coincidental
unfortunate timing, the possibility remains very real and the evidence remarkably
supportive. The aforementioned battles show that while the Northern people did
take notice of Rosecrans and his army, their hopes and dreams for the war still
lived and died with the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac. Still, it is most likely

29

Earl J. Hess, The Civil War in the West, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012),
186.
30

Daniel, Days, 276.
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that this is only one of several factors in the absence of material about the Army
of the Cumberland.
Quarreling Between Union Generals
Among the factors that have led to a misunderstanding of the Army of the
Cumberland’s significance are the personal feuds between high-ranking Union
officers, in particular Generals Grant, Buell, Rosecrans and Thomas. Though the
last three maintained fairly cordial professional relationships with one another, it
was Grant’s separate conflicts with all three individuals that helped seal the fate
of the army they each came to command.
The first conflict, between Grant and Buell, came right on the heels of the
Battle of Shiloh. To understand this conflict, the battle must first be analyzed to
locate the origin of those hard feelings. The Battle of Shiloh was almost an
enormous Confederate victory. On April 6th, 1862, Grant’s Army of the
Tennessee, with its back to the Tennessee River and Pittsburg Landing, had been
driven from their tents by an unexpected early-morning attack from Albert Sidney
Johnston’s Army of Mississippi. Grant had allowed his army to become lax, as
evidenced by lazy troop positioning and overconfidence. While he made his
headquarters in a mansion nine miles away from the field, his officers, refusing to
believe that Confederate troops were anywhere nearby, situated their men in a
way that Winston Groom states was more fit for “a peacetime army” than one

Published by ScholarWorks@GVSU, 2018
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actively campaigning in enemy territory. 31 In his own analysis of the battle, Larry
J. Daniel added, “the most critical mistake was the lack of fortifications, for which
neither Sherman nor Grant can escape culpability.”32 As a result, the Army of the
Tennessee stood on its back heels by the end of the first day of battle, awaiting a
final Confederate assault that never came.
Perhaps the largest reason it did not was due to the timely arrival of
Buell’s Army of the Ohio on the field beginning around 5:00 p.m. on the 6th.33
These fresh troops, numbering 13,000 men, added size and strength to Grant’s
force, enabling him to launch a devastating counterattack the next day, driving the
Army of Mississippi from the field.34 Without Buell’s troops, it is unlikely that
the counterattack could have been made, and it is quite possible that General
Beauregard (Johnston’s replacement after he had been killed) could have forced
Grant’s survivors into the Tennessee River if the Army of the Ohio had not
arrived.35
The newspapers were not kind to Grant following the battle, as many of
them labeled him a drunkard who had been intoxicated during the battle (a charge

31

Winston Groom, Shiloh, 1862, (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 2012), 60.
Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh: the Battle that Changed the Civil War (Simon & Schuster, 1997), 132.
33
Daniel, Shiloh, 246.
34
Daniel, Shiloh, 265, 290-292
35
James R. Chumney, “Don Carlos Buell and the Shiloh Campaign,” (West Tennessee Historical
Society Papers 66, December 2012), 20.
32
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that is almost certainly untrue).36 In stark contrast, the press lavished praise on
Buell’s men, claiming, “they were, in drill and appearance, the superiors of those
under Grant.”37 Understandably, Grant was considerably upset by this, and there
was, as one New York reporter wrote, “much ill feeling perceptible between the
respective commands of Generals Grant and Buell.”38
Grant had a similar relationship with Buell’s successor, Rosecrans.
However, one notable difference between the two relationships is that while Grant
and Buell had never particularly liked each other,39 Grant and Rosecrans had
worked well together on multiple occasions and had maintained a cordial
relationship for years prior to the Battle of Iuka.
That relationship began in 1839, while Grant was a student at West Point
and Rosecrans a cadet officer. Grant had been the victim of a cruel prank
regarding a faux night guarding duty, and Rosecrans took pity on him, sending
him back to his quarters. Twenty-three years later, when the two met again to
serve together in the Department of Mississippi, Grant wrote his wife that if he
must serve under any of his subordinates he would do so “willingly” under only
two: William Tecumseh Sherman (Grant’s closest friend) and Rosecrans.

36

Daniel, Shiloh, 307.
Stephen D. Engle, Don Carlos Buell, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999),
237.
38
Engle, Buell, 240.
39
Groom, Shiloh, 339. Daniel, Shiloh, 243. The origin of their dislike for each other seems
difficult to pinpoint, though Daniel attributed it to a “less than cordial” exchange in Nashville.
37
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Furthermore, Grant described Rosecrans as a “warm personal friend [and] one of
the ablest and purest of men, both in motive and action.”40 Unfortunately, this
friendship was shattered a few months later at the Battle of Iuka.
At Iuka, Grant tasked Rosecrans with defeating Sterling Price’s Army of
the West in a complex pincer movement. Unfortunately, as Rosecrans’ column
attacked Price, the other side of the pincer, commanded by Edward Ord, did not
budge. The signal for Ord’s movement was supposed to be the sounds of
Rosecrans’ guns, but Ord claimed after the battle that he had not heard the guns,
despite being only six miles away. As a result, Ord’s column never moved
forward, leaving Rosecrans to fight the Confederates alone.41 To his credit,
Rosecrans singlehandedly defeated Price, driving the rebels from the field. Grant,
though disappointed that Price had been able to get away, could find no fault in
Rosecrans’ performance. In his initial report of the battle, he wrote, “I cannot
speak too highly of the energy and skill displayed by General Rosecrans in the
attack, and of the endurance of the troops under him.”42 However, this opinion
would not last long, as the press began to turn against him once more.
When reports of the Battle of Iuka reached the Northern public, Grant
was again chastised by the Northern press, this time for not sending Ord’s column

Evan C. Jones, “From Friends to Enemies.” Civil War Times 53, no. 5: 30 (2014).
Peter Cozzens, Darkest Days of the War, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, c.
1997), 129-30.
42
William Lamers, Edge of Glory, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 122-3.
40
41
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to assist Rosecrans, and, once again, questions of Grant’s sobriety circulated in
the papers, infuriating him. Reports from the Cincinnati Commercial and
Cincinnati Gazette were particularly painful, since they operated mere miles from
Grant’s birthplace in Point Pleasant and childhood home in Georgetown. In an
unfortunate coincidence, Rosecrans was friends with the two key newspapermen
responsible for libeling Grant at both the Commercial and the Gazette. Rumors
circulated that Rosecrans had contacted his friends to instigate a “smear
campaign” against Grant. When Grant insinuated this in a report to Rosecrans, it
was the latter’s turn to be furious. He responded heatedly:
There are no headquarters in these United States less responsible for what
newspaper correspondents and paragraphists say of operations than
mine…After this declaration I am forced to say that if you do not meet me
frankly with a declaration that you are satisfied I shall consider my power
to be useful in this department ended.43

After twenty-three years of amity, it was not among the smoke and
musketry of Iuka, but in the musty air and rattle of two Cincinnati newspapers
that Grant and Rosecrans’ once fruitful, genial relationship withered and died. In
later reports, Grant excluded Rosecrans from praise, later citing his “neglect” at
not placing troops on a road blocking the Confederates’ escape. Without the
expected reinforcements from Grant and Ord, however, Rosecrans lacked the men

Jones, “Friends”. Grant seems to have let Rosecrans’ telegram go unanswered, as a survey of the
OR will show. It is likely that General Halleck ordered Rosecrans out of Grant’s command before
the latter could reply.
43
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and resources to capture or destroy Price’s army. Nevertheless, when writing his
memoirs years later, Grant penned, “I was disappointed at the result of the battle
of Iuka—but I had so high an opinion of General Rosecrans that I found no fault
at the time.”44
The opportunity for Grant’s revenge came a year later, when he was
promoted to command the Division of Mississippi in October of 1863.45 The
promotion had come just a few months after Grant’s capture of Vicksburg, the last
Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi River, along with the remainder of
John Pemberton’s Army of Mississippi. Finally, for the first time since his victory
at Fort Donelson in early 1862, it seemed the tables had turned his way. It was his
turn to be the hero of the Northern press, and his star rose even higher in the eyes
of Abraham Lincoln, who had been watching him with keen interest for over a
year. Unfortunately for Rosecrans, the Army of the Cumberland was one of the
armies included under Grant’s command. The timing could not have been worse
for him, as Rosecrans and his Cumberlanders had just been soundly defeated at
the Battle of Chickamauga and forced back into Chattanooga, where the
Confederates had cut off their supply lines, leading to widespread panic and
starvation in the army.46 Because of this, Rosecrans knew his head could very

44

Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs, (Lexington, KY, 1885), 245.
Peter Cozzens, Shipwreck of Their Hopes, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 4.
46
Cozzens, Shipwreck, 8-9.
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well be on the chopping block. However, Grant was given a choice by Secretary
of War Edwin Stanton: he could either leave Rosecrans in command of the Army
of the Cumberland or replace him with George H. Thomas, Rosecrans’ highestranking subordinate. The choice had been between reconciliation and revenge. If
Grant chose the former, the gesture of kindness Rosecrans had shown all those
years ago at West Point would be returned, and the friendship of the two men
could heal. If he chose the latter, Grant could rid himself of Rosecrans once and
for all and seal the fate of their enmity. Grant chose the latter. The ax fell on
October 19, when he relieved Rosecrans of command and replaced him with
George Thomas.47
Thomas differentiated greatly from Rosecrans in personality, despite their
genial working relationship. While Rosecrans was energetic and temperamental,
Thomas was quiet and stoic.48 Nor did Thomas have the prior history with Grant
that Rosecrans had. Indeed, when he was promoted to command the Army of the
Cumberland by Grant during the Chattanooga Campaign, the two men knew very
little about each other. Nevertheless, they grew to know each other quite well as
they began their campaign to equip and supply the besieged army. Unfortunately
for Thomas, Grant’s aggressive style contrasted sharply with his own defensive
preferences, and problems soon arose. The first occurred on November 7th, when
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Grant ordered Thomas to advance on Missionary Ridge. Thomas balked, as his
men remained ill-equipped and hungry, as the famous “Cracker Line” had only
been open for a week.49 For weeks, the two men debated when the attack should
take place, and whose forces would lead it. This frustrated the impatient Grant,
who, according to Thomas’ biographer, “[perceived] Thomas to be overly
cautious and slow.”50
When the attack finally did take place, however, it exceeded all
expectations. At 3:40 p.m. on November 25th, four divisions of the Army of the
Cumberland marched towards Missionary Ridge.51 They quickly drove the
Confederates from their positions at the base of the ridge, then, realizing their
position was exposed, proceeded to charge up the steep ridge without orders.52
Grant was furious. The Army of the Cumberland, which had already proven
Grant’s favorite target for criticism,53 was now disobeying his direct orders. He
quickly turned to Thomas, demanding to know if he had ordered them up the
ridge. Thomas said he had not.54 Grant asked another general if he had ordered
them forward. The general replied: “No, but when those fellows get started all

49

Christopher J. Einolf, George Thomas, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007) 208-9.
The “Cracker Line” was Grant’s method of supplying the Army of the Cumberland using a narrow
lane through the mountains around Chattanooga.
50
Einolf, Thomas, 210.
51
Einolf, Thomas, 215.
52
Einolf, Thomas, 216.
53
Daniel, Days, 370.
54
Einolf, Thomas, 216.

https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol5/iss1/1

20

Perkins: Not Written in Letters of Blood

hell can’t stop them.”55 Grant seethed, but this time at least, the general had been
right. The Cumberlanders took Missionary Ridge, driving off Bragg’s army.
Unfortunately, the damage to the relationship between Grant and Thomas had
been done, and “Grant came away from the campaign with a low opinion of
Thomas’ generalship.”56 When Grant was promoted to Commander-in-Chief, he
left his friend Sherman in charge of the Western armies rather than Thomas, who
was thought by most to be the more capable and qualified of the two.57
What does this mean when it comes to the memory of the Army of the
Cumberland? Unfortunately, Grant had a tendency to negate the positive
achievements of his political enemies, and Buell, Rosecrans and Thomas all fit
that bill.58 As Professor Frank Varney has illustrated in his book General Grant
and the Rewriting of History, Grant’s memoirs contain harsh criticism for those
who in his perception wronged him, and the book’s main focus is on that of
Grant’s favorite target: William Rosecrans.59 According to Varney, historians
have taken Grant at his word on many occasions, treating his memoirs as if they
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are flawless. As he demonstrates, however, this is not the case as Grant
continuously rewrote history to paint himself in a better light, while purposely
twisting facts to condemn those he disliked. This unfortunately includes not only
Rosecrans, but also Buell and Thomas.
The greatest victims of these feuds have been the Cumberlanders, as the
success of an army often depends on the success of its commander, and history
remembers armies with successful commanders. It is unlikely that the Grande
Armée would be remembered without Napoleon, the Carthaginians without
Hannibal, or the Macedonians without Alexander. It is therefore important to
determine who is to blame for the losses that the Army of the Cumberland
suffered, the men themselves or their commanders.
Mistakes of Command
Don Carlos Buell was the least competent of the Cumberland’s
commanders, and his men regarded him as such.60 In the battle that became
crucial to his reputation, he faltered. His first mistake was in making his
headquarters more than two miles behind the battlefield at the Dorsey house.61
That he was unable to ride was not entirely his fault: he was confined to bed after
his horse had fallen on top of him the night before.62 Nevertheless, his distance
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from the fighting only contributed to the determining factors of the battle: lack of
communication and a breakdown of command.63 As the battle raged late in the
afternoon of October 8th, Buell could hear only the big guns and assumed his plan
to attack the next day was still in place. He concluded that the sounds he could
hear were nothing but “a great waste of powder there” and ordered the firing
stopped.64 For the next two hours, he remained in his delusion. Meanwhile, the
troops under him found themselves in the fight of their lives back in Perryville.
The Confederates had not been content to wait for Buell to attack and had
sent one brigade against the Union left, making contact around 2:10 p.m.65 Many
of these Union troops were still green, while the members of this Confederate
brigade had served as far back as Shiloh. Nevertheless, after just twenty minutes
of furious fighting in and around Open Knob, the attack by these Confederate
veterans was forced back.66 It would not be the last. Minutes later, thousands of
gray-clad soldiers emerged from the woods, and the battle recommenced. Both
sides poured murderous fire into one another while reinforcements moved their
way.67 For hours, the fight raged on, as more troops were fed into the fray on the
Union left. Union General Alexander McCook’s corps, after fighting for an hour
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and a half, was near its breaking point.68 Buell was nowhere to be found. His lack
of presence on the battlefield contributed greatly to the confusion of Union
command, and the sun set on Union troops that had been slowly forced back,
taking heavy casualties. Even after the battle, Buell still failed to recognize the
scale of the fight.69 As a result, his days as commander of this army were
numbered.
Even if their commanding general had not understood the magnitude of
the battle, the soldiers had. They also understood that it was they, not their general
officers, who had prevented the army from falling into disaster. One officer wrote
of the fight: “To the soldiers in the ranks is the most credit due, as the nature of
the fight was such as to require no military science, but simply brave men.”70 The
Army of the Ohio had no shortage of brave men. Lovell Rousseau, a Union
general who had been in the thick of the fight, described a brigade who came to
his relief as “a gallant body of men” who “moved directly into the fight like true
soldiers.”71 Indeed, the majority of the soldiers who served in Buell’s army fought
well, despite their commanders’ failure to engineer a victory. In the end, the fault
for the tactical defeat at Perryville lay with Don Carlos Buell, not the future
Cumberlanders.
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William Rosecrans led many of those same men into their greatest
challenge less than a year later. After concluding his brilliant Tullahoma
Campaign by driving Bragg back to Chattanooga by maneuvers, he unwisely
believed exaggerated reports that Bragg’s army would not stop short of Atlanta,
and ordered his three corps to immediately pursue the Confederates, rather than
regroup at Chattanooga.72 Meanwhile, a dispute broke out between Rosecrans and
one of his divisional commanders, Thomas Wood. Wood, having received orders
from his corps commander to reconnoiter close to Chattanooga, refused to move,
stating that his men would be hopelessly exposed and that he would not blindly
obey orders.73 Instead, Wood moved his division two miles to the rear of his
position and sent Rosecrans an inflammatory message which the commanding
general found insulting and insubordinate.74 This event would have great
repercussions for the coming battle.
The first day of the Battle of Chickamauga, September 19th, was
segmented and inconclusive.75 It was the following day that would prove to be the
deciding factor of the battle. As the fighting raged in the center of the field,
George Thomas, commanding his XX Corps, requested an additional division to
support him. Rosecrans obliged, and the order went to John Brannan, who
72
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commanded the division connecting Thomas’ right flank to the left flank of the
XXI Corps, under Thomas Crittenden. Though Brannan initially obeyed the order
and moved his men out of line to help Thomas, he countermanded them shortly
afterwards, possibly fearing a Confederate attack that would fall on the gap his
men would have to leave in order to do so. Nevertheless, Rosecrans believed
Brannan’s division had pulled out, creating a division-long gap in his line. To
rectify this, he ordered that Thomas Wood’s division (on Brannan’s immediate
right) “close up” and plug the hole he believed Brannan’s division had left.76
When Wood was read the orders, he replied that there was no gap in the
line for his division to fill, since Brannan was still to Wood’s immediate left. The
staff officer who delivered the order promptly replied that it was to be dismissed
in that case. However, Wood, having been harshly criticized by Rosecrans before,
was not keen to repeat the process. Instead, he insisted that the order be followed,
and he pulled his division out of line to move to the left behind Brannan. Some
report that he said to his staff: “Gentlemen, I hold the fatal order of the day in my
hand and would not part with it for five thousand dollars.” By moving his division
out of line, he had in effect created the very problem he had been sent to rectify,
as there now was a gap between Brannan and the right.77
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Unfortunately for the Cumberlanders, at this same moment, James
Longstreet’s twenty-three-thousand-man command happened upon the huge gap
in the Union line.78 As Longstreet’s men began to sweep away the Union right,
Rosecrans became cut off from Thomas’ Corps by the retreating masses of
Thomas Crittenden’s XXI Corps, so he sent an order for him to report to
Chattanooga, believing the battle to be lost.79 In fact, Thomas’ men were putting
up a valiant fight on Horseshoe
Ridge and Snodgrass Hill, earning
him the nickname “Rock of
Chickamauga.”80
Historians have debated for
decades who is to blame for the
defeat at Chickamauga, whether it be
Rosecrans, Wood, or a disparity in
numbers (the Army of the

Longstreet’s men surge through the gap left by Wood’s division
(Courtesy: Civil War Trust)

Cumberland was outnumbered
during the battle).81 Ultimately, the man responsible for the success of the Army
of the Cumberland was its commander, William Rosecrans. He had made several
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disastrous mistakes during the day, including: relying too heavily on his corps
commanders, moving too many of his troops to Thomas’ defense, writing
complicated and confusing orders, and failing to come to Thomas’ aid to rally the
Cumberlanders on Horseshoe Ridge. It was this last action that was the “turningpoint” of Rosecrans’ career, and he spent the rest of his life trying to defend his
own actions during the battle.82
The men under his command, however, need no justification. As their
commander failed to lead them, thousands of Cumberlanders continued to fight
tenaciously. The 125th Ohio earned the nickname “Opdycke’s Tigers” for
devastating Confederates in the Dyer field, while August Willich’s brigade drove
back an entire Confederate division, an action for which it became known as the
“Iron Brigade of the Army of the Cumberland.”83 On Horseshoe Ridge, the 21st
Ohio held for six hours before being forced to surrender by a bizarre case of
mistaken identity, an action Peter Cozzens has called “the most distinguished
service rendered by any single regiment at Chickamauga.”84 Nor were these types
of stands in the minority. In fact, the majority of the Army of the Cumberland did
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not leave the field until 10:00 that night, nearly twelve full hours after the order
delivered to Wood had sealed its fate.85
It is an injustice to the men of the Army of the Cumberland that it has been
disregarded because of its commanders. Ultimately, it was Buell’s fault for the
fiasco of Perryville, Rosecrans’ fault for the defeat at Chickamauga, and Thomas’
sour relations with Grant that proved the army’s undoing, not the actions of the
Cumberlanders themselves. Unfortunately, in Grant’s quest to paint himself as the
only true hero of the West, he also swept aside the accomplishments of other
Western generals, in particular the three commanders of the Army of the
Cumberland. Unfortunately, many historians who have been heavily influenced
by Grant have done nothing to alleviate their ongoing struggle for attention.86 The
inability of these and other historians to separate the fates of the soldiers of the
Army of the Cumberland from the fate of their commander displays an
unfortunate lack of fact-checking and, therefore, historical credibility.
Southern Romanticism
The feud between Grant and the commanders of the Army of the
Cumberland can be summed up in one divisive phrase: “History is written by the
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victors.”87 However, in the case of the American Civil War, the victors have not
been the only ones penning its history. In a similar fashion to Grant’s censorship
of the Cumberlanders’ capabilities and exploits, some Southern historians and
their pride for the Confederacy have deprived the Army of the Cumberland of
receiving its due respect. This is mostly due to the mentality of some Southernsympathizing historians and ordinary Southerners themselves who believe in the
so-called “Lost Cause,” which maintains that the South fought an unwinnable
battle against an overwhelming enemy for honorable, justifiable reasons.88 To fit
this narrative, these historians and everyday men and women have placed too
much emphasis on their lionized hero Robert E. Lee, who fit the image of the
admirable warrior, and not enough on his less stellar counterpart, Braxton Bragg,
who did not. Just as the Army of the Cumberland’s fate plummeted with its
commanders’ careers, Bragg’s Army of Tennessee has suffered the same
indignity. This affects the Army of the Cumberland and its memory directly, as
the Southern view of the war has always been tugged away from Bragg’s army to
Lee’s. Unfortunately, if the focus of Southern historians is on Lee, they have little
to say about Bragg and even less to say about his enemies, Buell, Rosecrans,
Thomas and the Cumberlanders.

87

Often attributed to Winston Churchill, though its origin is unknown.
Edward H. Bonekemper, The Myth of the Lost Cause, (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing,
2015), xi.
88

https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol5/iss1/1

30

Perkins: Not Written in Letters of Blood

Robert E. Lee was the epitome of the “Southern Gentleman.” The son of
vaunted Revolutionary War hero “Light Horse” Harry, Lee grew up in his home
state of Virginia, serving with distinction during the Mexican War and the
Harper’s Ferry scuffle with John Brown and his men. When the Civil War broke
out, Lee was quickly called to Richmond and assigned a desk job by Jefferson
Davis. However, when the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, Joseph
Johnston, was wounded at the Battle of Seven Pines on the peninsula, Lee was
given command.89
As commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee excelled. He turned
back McClellan’s army from the gates of Richmond, ravaged John Pope at
Second Manassas, and drove into Maryland, where he was turned back at the
Battle of Antietam. Unfazed, he went on to maul Ambrose Burnside at
Fredericksburg and whip Joseph Hooker at Chancellorsville, before suffering his
greatest defeat at the hands of George Meade outside of Gettysburg,
Pennsylvania. Still, Lee persevered, stymieing Grant in the Wilderness at
Spotsylvania and badly defeating him at Cold Harbor, before finally crumbling
under the Siege of Petersburg. On April 9, 1865, the favorite Son of the South
surrendered to Grant, ending the war in the Eastern Theater.90
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Braxton Bragg was the complete opposite of Robert E. Lee. While Lee
worked well with his subordinates, had a knack for tactical brilliance, and was the
perfect model of the Christian general, Bragg was vitriolic, profane, and tactically
unsuccessful. As Lee churned out success after success from Virginia, Bragg
“snatched defeat from the jaws of victory”91 time and time again in Kentucky and
Tennessee.
This has led to the permeation of Lee-centered Southern revisionism that
is prevalent and obvious to this day. A more noticeable example is the so-called
“rebel flag.” In Southern states across the U.S., and many north of the MasonDixon as well, these flags adorn gift shops, pickup trucks, tattooed limbs, and
home windows. Yet, not only was this flag not the national flag of the
Confederate States of America (that distinction belongs to the far less known
Stars and Bars), but it originally flew as the battle flag of the Army of Northern
Virginia, Lee’s army.92 Gradually, in an occurrence that would foreshadow the
influence of future Leeism, Western armies began adopting the “Southern Cross”
as their own battle flag.93 As a result, the most popular item of memorabilia from
the Civil War is inextricably linked to the Virginia general, so much so that even
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the Dodge Charger featured in the Dukes of Hazzard, emblazoned with the
Southern Cross, became known as the “General Lee.”
This is not the only instance in which Lee has been seared into the
Southern conscious as the premier general of the Civil War. His name highlights
the titles of high schools, colleges, streets, academic halls, ships, and tanks. His
image is displayed on everything from t-shirts to paintings and sculptures, and
even the side of Stone Mountain in Atlanta. Bragg, on the other hand, is the
namesake of two forts and a ghost town in Texas.
Is this oversight justified? Perhaps. Unlike the Grant/Rosecrans debacle,
where the two generals were of equal or similar caliber, Lee and Bragg could
hardly have been farther apart. All told, Lee’s major victories number around
four: the Peninsula Campaign, the battles of Second Manassas (or Second Bull
Run), Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. In addition, he was adored by his
men, who referred to him affectionately as “Marse Robert.”94 Bragg commanded
very little respect from his own troops, and their apathy is understandable.95 When
it came to victories, Bragg could boast only one: the Battle of Chickamauga.
Their defeats are similarly lopsided. Lee arguably lost two battles: Antietam
(disputed) and Gettysburg. Bragg, conversely, was defeated in the battles of
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Perryville (though only strategically); Stones River, during the Tullahoma
Campaign; and the battles for Chattanooga.
One look at Bragg’s battle record is enough for any champion of the Lost
Cause to wince. The Lost Cause is dependent on the idea that the South fought
valiantly against insurmountable odds, an idea that has its roots, and indeed its
entire existence, in the battle prowess of Robert E. Lee.96 Any possibility that runs
contrary to this idea must then either be ignored entirely or acknowledged only
grudgingly and fleetingly. Therefore, because Bragg’s and the Army of
Tennessee’s existence is a perplexing enigma that is easier to ignore than explain,
many Southern historians have chosen the former.
Are these historians at fault? Not necessarily. Ignorance may be bliss, but
it is not always chosen. Because many of the initial histories of the war that “Lost
Cause” enthusiasts fashioned do not dwell on Bragg’s army, many subsequent
historians, who base their own writings on the work of their predecessors, may
simply not know much of Bragg’s existence, thus skewing their uninformed
opinions towards the Lost Cause idea that the South had better generals who put
up a good fight against unbeatable foes.
This is an idea that must be put to rest if the Army of the Cumberland is
ever going to be remembered correctly. While it is true that before the Battle of
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Gettysburg, the Army of the Potomac suffered many defeats and won few
victories, the exact opposite was true for the Army of the Cumberland. From the
outset of the war, the men who became Cumberlanders were winning more than
they were losing. They won the battles of Mill Springs and Shiloh, drove the
Confederates out of Kentucky and deep into Tennessee, won again at Stones
River, and drove the Confederates again, this time back to Chattanooga. By the
time the Army of the Potomac had finally had its first taste of real victory at the
so-called “turning point” of the war, Gettysburg, the Army of the Cumberland had
defeated the Confederates three times tactically, twice strategically, and stood on
the doorstep to the key railroad hub of Chattanooga.
It is facts like these that led the late renowned Civil War historian Shelby
Foote, a Southerner himself, to say, “I don’t think the South ever had a chance to
win [the] war.”97 This statement is consistent with Lost Cause ideology which
hinges on the belief that the South faced an impossible foe. More importantly,
Lost Cause historians place great importance on Robert E. Lee’s seeming ability
to conquer a military goliath in the Union. However, if one studies the war from
an objective viewpoint, it becomes clear that the feats of Western armies like the
Army of the Cumberland dampen the importance of Lee’s successes in the
Eastern Theater. While this may in some ways contribute to the idea that the
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South never had a chance at victory, it also downplays Lee’s importance, as the
other Southern armies were consistently defeated by their Western enemies.
Unfortunately for the men in those armies, the eyes of the public had
always rested on the Army of the Potomac, as they still do in the fundamental
understanding of the war today. The Eastern Theater, often considered the
essential, main history of the war, is the worst example of Union success prior to
1863, yet it remains to be seen that way because of the focus on Robert E. Lee
and the Army of Northern Virginia.
Finding a Balance
This work is not meant to be an indictment of any historians who have not
focused their research and writings on the Army of the Cumberland, nor is it a
condemnation of the noble soldiers those historians have chosen to focus on;
those men have earned their right place in history as heroes of the Union. Instead,
it is a call to arms, or the shining of a light on soldiers who have also earned their
place but have not yet received it. It is a plea for historians to see the
Cumberlanders for their true value and an encouragement to do what historians do
best: bring new studies and interpretations to the table.
The Army of the Cumberland is one of the most important armies in
American history. For three long years, it slugged its way through the wilderness
of Eastern Tennessee and Northern Georgia: crossing rivers, navigating forests,
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and climbing mountains, covering an expanse five times greater than that covered
by the Army of the Potomac and with far fewer men.98 It was the only Union
army during the war to destroy an enemy army, which it did thoroughly under
Thomas at the Battle of Nashville.99 Indeed, many of the men who had called
themselves Cumberlanders found themselves marching through Georgia with
Sherman in 1864.100 Those men—who went into battle at Shiloh, Perryville,
Stones River, Tullahoma, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Franklin, and Nashville—
should be considered of equal value with those who did so at Bull Run, the
Peninsula, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and
Petersburg. The blood they spilled was the same: Northern, Union blood. They
fought for the same country, under the same flag, for the same reasons. Those
men, and their leaders, deserve to have their stories told just as much as their
Eastern comrades. They have earned their place in history as heroes of the Union.
A well-rounded interpretation of the Civil War encapsulates both theaters
of war and all the major armies therein. It does not favor one army over the other,
one theater over the other, nor does it favor the Confederacy over the Union,
Grant over Rosecrans, or Lee over Bragg. One of the chief goals of all historians
is to present all available information on a subject in an objective, informative
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matter. However, it would be a disservice if an historian whose passion was for
Gettysburg was to be dismayed at the high number of books on the subject and
decided not to write. Likewise, if a historian was eager to write about the Battle of
Stones River, it would be unfortunate if he became distraught with the seemingly
low level of interest and information on the subject and came to the same
conclusion. Thus, if any person is interested in a particular subject, that is the
subject they ought to research and write about.
Therein lies the purposes of this work: to generate interest and focus
attention. There is no shortage of interest or attention for the Army of the
Potomac or the Eastern Theater of the Civil War. The men who served in that
army have received their due share of glory. The Cumberlanders, as of yet, have
not. Hence, if while scanning these pages, any reader has been intrigued by the
Army of the Cumberland, by the battles of Shiloh, Stones River or Tullahoma, by
Buell, Rosecrans or Thomas, by the men in the ranks themselves, or by the
Western Theater in general, and that reader decides to devote his research on
those subjects, then this work has been a success. It is hoped that by bringing this
subject to light, others will be inspired to put effort into interpreting the stories of
the Cumberlanders from different points of view, so as to cover all possible
interpretations and thus gain a better understanding of the truth. It is this truth that
all historians are meant to pursue, and it would truly be a tragedy if the Army of
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the Cumberland continues to be overshadowed in Civil War history simply
because its story is not written in letters of blood.
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